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Abstract
This Essay discusses privatization and financing developments in the Middle East power mar-
ket. In the coming years, the power sector will experience unprecedented growth and investment
due to the increasing demand for electricity throughout the region and the desire of governments
to diversify their economies away from oil. This need for electricity has fueled the drive towards
privatization and the growth of independent power projects (or “IPPs”).
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past five years, the Middle East region' has become
an oasis of project finance 2 opportunity. Lenders have closed
almost US$27 billion in project loans, with another US$54 bil-
lion of loans in various stages of development or financing.' Ex-
panding regional populations, macroeconomic growth, and a
rising demand for services are driving the market.4 As the legal,
business, and regulatory environments in the region continue to
develop and improve, the world financial community is becom-
ing more interested in financing projects in the Middle East.'
These demographic, regulatory, and economic changes, cou-
pled with the desire of governments to keep these projects off
their balance sheets, have made the Middle East the region du
jour of international project financiers.
While traditional project financing techniques are enjoying
* Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, London.
1. For the purposes of this Essay, the "Middle East region" includes the area from
North Africa to the Gulf region (i.e., Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan, Israel, the Gaza Strip, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen,
Oman, and the United Arab Emirates).
2. Project finance is, generally speaking, the financing of a project in which the
lenders rely principally on the revenue stream generated by the operation of the pro-
ject for the repayment of their loans. In essence, investors look to the creditworthiness
and merits of the project rather than to the project sponsors. MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY
& MCCLOY, PROJECT FINANCE: THE GUIDE To FINANCING INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS
PROJECTS 3 (1996).
3. Standard & Poor's, Project Finance in the Middle East: Emerging Opportunities, 1999
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: PROJECT FINANCE, UTILITIES AND CONCESSIONS, CRITERIA AND
COMMENTARY, Oct. 1999, at 126.
4. See Baker IV & R. Thomas Amis, The Middle East Power Sector: Poised for Growth,
POWER ECON., Jan. 30, 2001; Frederik Sladden, US-ARAB TRADELINE, Feb. 18, 2000.
5. Standard & Poor's, supra note 3, at 126.
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less popularity now in certain parts of the globe,6 project finance
remains a viable and effective means of financing infrastructure
in the Middle East, particularly in the power, oil, and gas sec-
tors.7 First, governments are more reluctant to spend public
money on large, capital-intensive projects due to the volatility of
oil prices and accordingly, oil revenues. Instead, they have
started to explore private means of financing these projects.'
Second, there is a trend towards engaging in joint ventures for
large infrastructure projects, especially in emerging market
countries, and project finance is well-suited for financing joint
ventures.9 Third, project finance enables sponsors to allocate
and transfer various project risks to other parties, thus decreas-
ing the sponsors' overall risk exposure. Fourth, such limited re-
course financing allows cash-strapped sponsors to take advantage
of off-balance-sheet financing and tax incentives.1 ° Thus, project
finance remains a sought-after financing tool for governments
that are seeking private finance and for project sponsors who
wish to minimize their potential liabilities in emerging market
regions.
This Essay discusses privatization and financing develop-
ments in the Middle East power market. In the coming years,
the power sector will experience unprecedented growth and in-
vestment due to the increasing demand for electricity through-
out the region and the desire of governments to diversify their
economies away from oil.1 This need for electricity has fueled
the drive towards privatization and the growth of independent
power projects (or "IPPs").
The privatization programs that are being developed and
implemented in the Middle East generally possess similar strate-
gies. These policies are characterized by a gradual, regulated
6. See PROJECT FIN. MAC., Feb. 9, 2001 (stating that Brazilian state oil company
Petrobras announced that it is ending the use of project finance vehicles for new off-
shore projects citing high costs, bureaucracy, and slowness); see also Sponsor Profile-
Calpine, PROJECT FIN. MAG., Nov. 2000, at 29 (describing the explanation of Calpine
Senior Vice-President for Finance, Robert D. Kelly, as to why Calpine Corporation
moved away from using the traditional project finance model in U.S. power projects).
7. Standard & Poor's, supra note 3, at 126.
8. See Baker & Amis, supra note 4, at 18.
9. Id.
10. See Lucy Baker, Listening to a Pioneer, George Wadia, Interview, PROJECT FIN. MAG.,
Dec. 1, 1998; see also Standard & Poor's, supra note 3, at 126.
11. Baker & Amis, supra note 4, at 18; see Taimur Ahmad, Wat Gul?, PROJECT FIN.
MAG., Dec. 1, 2000.
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transition of state-owned generation and distribution activities to
private ownership. In order to illustrate the path that privatiza-
tion is taking in the Middle East, the efforts of Abu Dhabi, Jor-
dan, and Saudi Arabia will be discussed.
The development of new, "greenfield" independent power
projects is usually the first step in the privatization of the power
sector. Often, governments faced with serious capacity and
power shortages turn to IPPs first because they are the simplest
and most efficient method for creating new electricity supply.
IPPs are flourishing in the Middle East as a result of electricity
sector restructuring efforts, improvements in foreign investment
laws, and the development of investor-friendly legal and regula-
tory regimes.
As the IPP market continues to grow and develop, financing
structures for these projects are also evolving. In the past year,
elegant and aggressive structures more typical of Western Euro-
pean financings were used in Abu Dhabi and Oman. These so-
phisticated financing structures are likely to spread to other
countries in the region as investors gain more comfort and expo-
sure to the region as a whole. To illustrate the evolution in IPP
financing, the following projects will be discussed: the Al Manah
IPP in Oman (1994),12 the Taweelah A-1 Independent Water
and Power Project ("IWPP") in Abu Dhabi (2000), and the
Barka IWPP and Al Kamil IPP in Oman (2001).
I. THE GROWING DEMAND FOR POWER-GOVERNMENTS
COURT THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The compelling need for power has heralded the privatiza-
tion of power and the development of IPPs in the Middle East. 3
In fact, the demand for power in some Middle Eastern countries
is growing at 10% a year.14 An estimated 100,000 MW of capacity
will be required in the Middle East/North African area over the
next ten years. 5 Governments cannot afford to foot the bill
alone for such large-scale investments in infrastructure-a re-
cent study by the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultancy
12. This was the first IPP in the region.
13. See On the Move, MEED, Jan. 5, 2001, at 21 ("If there is a common thread run-
ning through the region, it is the pressing need for new power capacity.").
14. Id.
15. The Power Game, MEED, Jan. 26, 2001, at 23.
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determined that electricity sector investment in the Gulf region
is likely to exceed US$100 billion over the next decade. t6 Thus,
many governments are turning to private foreign investment as
the answer. 1
7
In order to attract private developers, many of the region's
governments, including Saudi Arabia,' 8  Oman,19  Jordan,2 °
Egypt,"1 Israel,22 and the United Arab Emirates ("UAE"), 2a have
16. See Baker & Amis, supra note 4, at 18; see also The Power Game, supra note 15, at
23.
17. See Philip Carter, Generating Excitement, PROJECT AND TRADE FIN., Mar. 1997, at
39-42 ("[T]he only route open to governments in the Middle East if they are to meet
both the demand for power and their desire to keep it off their own balance sheets is to
look for private finance.").
18. For instance, Saudi Arabia has recently introduced the following changes: the
merger of the Saudi regional electricity companies into one entity, the formation of the
Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority to streamline investment and reduce bu-
reaucratic red tape, the adoption in April 2000 of a new Foreign Investment Law, and
the consideration of a new tax code governing foreign investment. The Foreign Invest-
ment Law provides equal tax treatment to foreign and local investors, permits 100%
foreign ownership of projects, and gives foreign investors access to attractive finance
from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund. In addition, the government is consider-
ing the adoption of a new electricity law and regulations to push the privatization pro-
cess along. Ushering in the New Generation, MEED, Mar. 16, 2001, at 24; Jason T. Bur-
dette, Saudi Law Launches New Investment, US-ARAB TRADELINE, Apr. 21, 2000; Baker &
Amis, supra note 4, at 18.
19. In Oman, the government has increased the permitted level of foreign owner-
ship in local companies from 49% to 65%, with possible further increases in the near
future. The tax laws also have been amended to encourage foreign investment as well.
See Taimur Ahmad, Oman Unveils, PROJECT FIN. MAC., Feb. 1, 2000.
In addition, Oman has introduced an ambitious privatization program that was
inaugurated with the promulgation of its 1996 Privatization Law by Royal Decree 42/96.
See Privatisation and Regulation in Oman: Action Plan, EIU BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Nov. 1,
1996. It involves unbundling and corporatizing the ministry's existing activities into a
number of separate generation, transmission, and distribution businesses, which will be
initially owned by the government and then privatized. The initial phase focuses on
new generating capacity and the completion of the national electric grid. The remain-
der of the agenda includes the privatization of existing generators and the creation of
three transmission companies and regional distribution entities. See Sladden, sura
note 4. The government is in the process of drafting a new law that will establish a
specialized regulatory body to monitor the privatized power companies. See PROJECT
FIN. MAC., Feb. 9, 2001.
20. Jordan passed an investment law in 1995 to ease restrictions on foreign invest-
ments. This law permits foreign direct investment in all projects and sectors, removes
foreign shareholder limits, and reduces minimum capital requirements. Investors have
the right to repatriate capital, profits, and dividends in any convertible currency. Baker
& Amis, supra note 4, at 18. In 1999, Jordan repealed the Electricity Law of 1996 and
replaced it with a new General Electricity Law No. (13), which will be discussed in
greater detail in this Essay. Id.
21. Egypt implemented an aggressive privatization and economic reform program
starting in 1991, which encourages foreign investment, places no transferability restric-
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begun to implement a mix of foreign investment laws, transpar-
ent regulatory institutions, and privatization programs. Many
other states in the Middle East are in the process of developing
these types of reform as well.24 This Essay focuses on the priva-
tization efforts taking place in the region.
II. PRIVATIZATION OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Privatization is defined as the act of transferring assets, or
responsibility for a service, from government control or owner-
ship to private enterprise. It has been said that " [t] he essence of
privatization is the transfer of commercial risk to the private sec-
tor .. . the necessary corollary of [that] transfer of risk is the
corresponding transfer of control and decision-making to those
managing that risk."'25 Political perceptions, 26 as well as reali-
ties, 27 however, make governments cautious about relinquishing
outright control of the power sector to private investors. In fact,
tions on money, and protects owners from nationalization, certain forms of expropria-
tion, asset and license seizures, and regulation of prices or profits. Id. In July 1999, the
government opened the door to privatizing seven regional generation and distribution
companies by permitting initial offerings in three of the companies. See Sladden, supra
note 4.
22. Israel's Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments offers various in-
centives, such as government grants and tax benefits, to investors investing in approved
enterprises. See ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISRAEL'S INVESTMENT POLICY. In addition,
Israel passed a new electricity law in 1996 that allows the energy minister to grant per-
mits to IPPs. Israel has also adopted new regulations to allow private power producers
to sell directly to end-users rather than to the state-owned Israeli Electric Corporation.
See Sladden, supra note 4.
23. In 1998, the government of the United Arab Emirates adopted a new program
encouraging direct foreign investment in the power sector. Id. A detailed discussion of
Abu Dhabi's privatization program is discussed later in this Essay.
24. Morocco, Lebanon, Iran, and Qatar are in various stages of planning and insti-
tuting economic and regulatory reforms of their respective power industries. Id. See
generally The Power Game, supra note 15, at 23.
25. Martin Amison, Privatization and Project Finance in the Middle East, INT'L FIN. L.
REv., Nov. 1995, at 14.
26. Water and electricity are perceived by the public as fundamental utilities that
should be owned and/or controlled by the government. See Tentative Projects Market
Develops in the Gulf, PRIVATISATION INT'L, July 1, 1999; Privatisation Issues in the GCC States;
PROJECr FIN. INT'L, Dec.12, 1997. In the UK, former Prime Minister Harold MacMillan,
an opponent of utility privatization, described the privatization of utilities as "selling off
the family silver" in a speech made in the House of Lords. Id.
27. Privatization will create the following results: privatized businesses will employ
fewer people than public authorities, unsubsidized consumer tariffs based on real costs
will cause public consternation, and a greater degree of control must pass to those who
are assuming the risks of the project.
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the policies being implemented in the Middle East call for priva-
tization to be done in stages, with the governments maintaining,
at least initially, a large degree of control over the decision-mak-
ing.
The Middle East privatization programs share common
themes. The objectives are three-fold. First, the state's genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution activities are unbundled.
Second, one or more of these separated businesses are then
transferred to independently managed, government-owned com-
panies. 2' Third, these new corporatized entities are then gradu-
ally sold off to private investors. In most cases, the generation
business is being privatized first, through the creation of IPPs
and the privatization of existing power plants. Furthermore, the
states are following the single "government buyer" model (i.e.,
private independent power producers sell their electricity to a
state-owned entity who maintains control and ownership of the
transmission sector) .29 These common attributes are illustrated
by the privatization efforts of Abu Dhabi, Jordan, and Saudi Ara-
bia.
III. ABU DHABI. A REGIONAL LEADER IN
POWER PRIVATIZATION
Abu Dhabi, one of the seven emirates comprising the
UAE, 10 has been, and continues to be, a regional leader in re-
28. See generally Baker & Amis, supra note 4, at 18. Most of these companies are
initially majority-owned and controlled by the government. But in Qatar, assets owned
by the Qatari Ministry of Electricity and Water were transferred in May 2000 to the
Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation ("QEWC"), a closed joint stock com-
pany that is 57% controlled by local investors and 43% controlled by the government.
UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ENERGY REPORT ON QATAR (July
2000).
29. See generally Baker & Amis, supra note 4, at 18. But in Israel, new regulations
have been adopted that allow private power producers to sell their electricity directly to
end-users rather than to the state-owned Israel Electric Corporation ("IEC"). Israel is
also studying the possible privatization of the IEC. Id. In addition, Oman is in the
process of developing and financing the privatization of the Salalah IPP, which is dis-
cussed later in this Essay. The Salalah IPP will, for the first time, involve a private com-
pany selling power to end-users.
30. The UAE is a federation made up of the following emirates: Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Umm al-Qaiwain. In June 1996,
the UAE's Federal National Council approved a permanent constitution for the coun-
try. Political power is concentrated in the capital, Abu Dhabi. See Report on United Arab
Emirates, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Oct. 2000.
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structuring and privatizing the power sector.3' Abu Dhabi com-
menced its program in 1996 with the issuance of Decision No. 1,
which established the Privatization Committee for the Water and
Electricity Sector. After the Committee's completion of an elab-
orate study, the Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi issued Amiri Decree
No. 7 of 1997, which set forth the government's three-pronged
approach for restructuring and privatizing the water and elec-
tricity sector. This approach involves (1) separating the assets of
the state-run Water and Electricity Department ("WED") into
separate entities and transferring interests in certain of those en-
tities to private ownership, (2) developing and implementing a
new legal and regulatory framework,12 and (3) meeting future
electricity and water demand through IWPP projects. 3 3
In February 1998, the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Au-
thority ("ADWEN') succeeded WED. ADWEA has overall re-
sponsibility for the water and electricity sector. The Abu Dhabi
Water and Electricity Company ("ADWEC"), a company organ-
ized by ADWEA, serves as the exclusive wholesale purchaser and
seller of power and water for the industry and is responsible for
capacity planning and the tendering process for IWPPs. AD-
WEC is also the central purchaser of feedstock gas for the gener-
ation and desalination companies.
34
ADWEC's role will be to purchase water and power from
various independent generation and desalination companies
(including IWPPs) via long-term power and water purchase
agreements. ADWEC will then sell the water and power to the
two distribution companies, via the state-owned transmission
company ("Transco"), at a bulk supply tariff.35 This tariff will
31. See Tentative Projects Market Develops in the Gulf, PRIVATISATION INTERNATIONAL,
July 1, 1999.
32. Law No. 2 of 1998, Concerning the Regulation of the Water and the Electricity
Sector in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, established the Regulation and Supervision Bu-
reau, the first independent regulator in the Middle East. The Bureau, among other
duties, monitors and ensures against monopolistic tendencies. See Ahmad, supra note
11.
33. Phillip Fletcher & Simon Davies, Financing Success for Taweelah Al, PROJECT FIN.
INT'L Y.B., at 128 (2001); Alexander S. Kritzalis & Omar H. A-Farisi, Taweelah A-2- A
Template for Future 1WPP Projects in the Middle East, PROJECT FIN. INT'L Y.B., 1999, at 134;
see also Special Report: Abu Dhabi, MEED, Feb. 20, 1998, at 8.
34. Id.
35. Law No. 2 of 1998, Concerning the Regulation of the Water and Electricity
Sector in the Emirate ofAbu Dhabi, created the Abu Dhabi Transmission and Dispatch
Company ("Transco"), various generation and desalination companies, and two distri-
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include the cost of generation, ADWEC's operating costs, and
the cost of dispatch. The distribution companies will then have
to establish a non-subsidized customer tariff based on economic
cost, which will include the cost of bulk supply, the transmission
cost, and the distribution cost. Government subsidies will only
be provided through a direct payment at the customer level for
certain customer groups.36 An independent regulatory agency
will oversee the new companies and institutions, as well as regu-
late tariffs.
Pursuant to this privatization program, competition has re-
cently been introduced into generation/desalination activities.
Two IWPPs reached financial close thus far: the Taweelah A-2
project in 1999, and Taweelah A-1 project in 2000."7 In both
projects, the government retains sixty percent majority owner-
ship and intends to gradually privatize its shares through initial
public offerings to UAE nationals.38 Currently, Abu Dhabi is in
the bidding process for its third and most ambitious IWPP to
date, the 1500 MW, 100 million gallon per day Shuweihat pro-
ject.39
The privatization of the distribution and transmission sec-
tors, however, is far less developed. Only limited competition is
permitted between the regional distribution companies and, so
far, no private investor has been brought on board. The trans-
mission business is to remain, at least for the time being, a natu-
ral state monopoly.4 ° This monopoly positions the government
as the intermediary between the generation and distribution
companies and allows the state to keep close control over the
bution companies, one for Abu Dhabi and one for Al-Ain. See Kritzalis, supra note 33, at
135. The distribution companies are responsible for any additions to the distribution
network. See Special Report: Abu Dhabi, supra note 33.
36. Kritzalis & AI-Farisi, supra note 33, at 134. Currently, however, the cost of
power to consumers is being subsidized by the government. Ahmad, supra note 11.
37. The Taweelah A-2 project is a 710 MW, 50 million imperial gallon per day
plant. The Taweelah A-i project involves expanding the A-i plant from 225 MW to
1350 MW. See Fletcher, supra note 33, at 129; see also Kritzalis & Al-Farisi, supra note 33,
at 135.
38. Id. See Special Report: Abu Dhabi, supra note 33. In response to questions about
the government's continuing dominant role in the sector, Abdullah Al Neaimi, director
of IWPPs at ADWEA, countered, "[I]t takes time to privatize effectively. Right now
we're not working with fully real market models, but we're working towards them."
Ahmad, supra note 11.
39. See Ahmad, supra note 11.
40. Id.
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level of any subsidy.4' Jordan's privatization program, although
not as mature as Abu Dhabi's, follows a similar template.
IV. JORDAN-LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR
STRUCTURAL REFORM
It is estimated that Jordan will need over 10,000 GWh of
electricity production to meet its requirements in 2005 and
12,500 GWh by 2010, a thirty-four percent and sixty-five percent
increase, respectively, over the current 2000 levels.42 Like Abu
Dhabi, Jordan's privatization program centers on a single gov-
ernment buyer approach. Transmission activities are to remain
state-owned, while the generation and distribution businesses
are to be gradually privatized.
In 1999, in an effort to pave the way for privatization, the
Jordanian government replaced the Electricity Law of 1996 with
a new General Electricity Law No. (13). In the same year, the
National Electric Power Company ("NEPCO"), the state-owned
utility company responsible for electricity production, was un-
bundled into three companies: NEPCO, the Central Electric
Generating Company ("CEGCO"), and the Electric Distribution
Company ("EDCO").
NEPCO, which is to remain fully owned by the government,
is responsible for the management, operation, and development
of the high voltage transmission network, load dispatching, and
the regional electric grid network. For the time being, NEPCO
will be the sole buyer of the electricity generated by CEGCO and
any private power plants.
CEGCO is the main power generating company in Jordan
and is slated for privatization in the next few years. Currently,
CEGCO is a public shareholding company, seventy-five percent
owned by the government and twenty-five percent owned by
NEPCO. EDCO, also listed for privatization, is a public share-
holding company that is fully owned by the government. EDCO
is responsible for electricity distribution outside the concession
areas awarded to the Jordan Electric Power Company
("JEPCO") 43  and Irbid Distribution Electricity Company
41. See Special Report: Abu Dhabi, supra note 33.
42. Goussous, EXPORT AND FINANCE BANK, JORDAN ELECTRICITY SECTOR REPORT, Jan,
23, 2001.
43. JEPCO, a public shareholding company, has a concession to distribute electric-
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("IDECO") .44 The government is in the final stages of selecting
an advisory group to assist it in devising a strategy for the partial
privatization of CEGCO and EDCO.45 The privatization process
is expected to commence around March 2002. In the
meantime, the government is pushing ahead with its plans for a
partial divestiture of fifty-five to seventy percent of its ownership
in IDECO.46
Electricity tariffs were set by the Jordanian government in
May 1996. Due to the increase in oil prices in the past year, the
government is believed to be undertaking a review of the tariffs
within the next six months.47 The tariff rate on the electricity
sold to utilities will probably increase, and this increase will
trickle down to the end users, but not at the same rate.48
In May 2000, the government declared Belgium developer
Tractebel as preferred bidder for the construction, operation,
and ownership of the country's first IPP. The IPP, which will
have a capacity of 450 MW, will be located at Kherbet-Al-Samra.
The government and Tractebel are currently negotiating certain
aspects of the project, including the terms for financing the pro-
ject, with the hopes of achieving financial close within the next
year.
V. SAUDI ARABIA-ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK?
Power project developers are closely watching Saudi Ara-
bia's efforts to restructure its electricity sector. Saudi Arabia pos-
sesses a great deal of IPP potential-it needs to invest an esti-
mated US$117 billion over the next twenty-two years to keep up
with its projected electricity demand, which calls for expanding
generating capacity by an estimated 50,000 MW.49 Saudi Ara-
bia's policy, although not as clearly developed as Abu Dhabi's or
Jordan's, appears to propose a similar strategy: unbundle state
ity from Wadi AI-Deleil in the north to Theiban in the south, and from Mogawar in the
east to the Jordan Valley in the west.
44. IDECO is a public shareholding company responsible for transmitting and dis-
tributing electricity in the governorates of Irbid, Jerash, Mafraq, and Ajloun.
45. Goussous, supra note 42. Progress in privatizing these companies is a condi-
tion for Jordan's extended fund facility agreement with the International Monetary
Fund. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Baker & Amis, supra note 4.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
assets into generation, transmission, and distribution companies
and adhere to the single government buyer approach.5" Recent
events at the end of last year, however, have called into question
the government's commitment to privatization and reform.
Saudi Arabia's restructuring program received a kick-start in
February 2000 when the Saudi Industry and Electricity Minister
signed a merger agreement among Saudi Arabia's ten existing
power companies. On April 5, 2000, the newly formed entity,
the Saudi Electricity Company ("SEC"), was established as a
joint-stock company, with the government holding a fifty percent
ownership interest. According to the 1998 Decree (No. 169) on
the Reorganization and Restructuring of the Electricity Sector,
the government must establish a regulatory body during the first
year after the incorporation of the SEC. Thus, the deadline for
the formation of the regulatory agency is fast approaching. Gov-
ernment officials, however, remain adamant that they will meet
this deadline. 51
According to Industry and Electricity Minister Hashim
Yamani, the government will privatize the generation sector
first.52 The government plans to use the single buyer approach
initially, with the intention of moving to a power pool model
within ten years." Although foreign investor participation is
welcomed in the generation sector, foreign investors are cur-
rently barred from involvement in transmission and distribution
activities. 4
50. See Saudi Arabia: Avoiding the California Nightmare, MEED, Feb. 2, 2001, at 4.
51. Id. In a move that may signal the imminent establishment of a regulatory
body, the government recently announced the appointments of its legal advisor and
management consultant, both of whom will assist the financial consultant with the re-
structuring. Id.
52. Id. In October 2000, Saudi Arabia established a new utility company called
Marafiq (the Power and Water Utility Company for Jubail and Yanbu). Marafiq,
founded by the Royal Commission, the Public Investments Fund, Saudi ARAMCO, and
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, is to meet the future utility requirements of the two
industrial cities of'Jubail and Yanbu. Id. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, RE-
PORT ON SAUDI ARABIA, Nov. 2000.
53. Id.
54. In February 2001, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority ("SAGIA")
clarified government policy and published the "Negative List," which specifies those
activities that are excluded from foreign investment. Power transmission and distribu-
tion were included on the list. This does not mean, however, that transmission and
distribution activities will forever be excluded, since the list will be periodically re-
viewed. SAGIA has said that the first review will be completed next year. See Ushering in
the New Generation, MEED, Mar. 16, 2001, at 24.
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On October 9, 2000, the government appeared to falter in
its commitment to restructuring when it succumbed to public
pressure and rescinded the tariff increases established by the
SEC in April 2000. Decree 169 established a new tariff structure
that would enable IPPs to operate with a reasonable rate of re-
turn without the need for a government-guaranteed dividend.
The SEC applied these tariffs in April 2000, but was forced to
reduce them six months later (effective October 28, 2000) fol-
lowing public outcry from consumers who, accustomed to receiv-
ing government-subsidized electricity, were shocked at the in-
creases in their electricity bills. Economists say that the new re-
duced tariffs, which, pursuant to Decree 169 cannot be raised
for two years, are twenty-five percent below the minimum level
that would provide an acceptable rate of return for investors."
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the tariff struc-
ture, Saudi Arabia's under-developed legal and operating envi-
ronment, as well as the government's reluctance to provide guar-
antees, present further challenges to the restructuring and priva-
tizing of its power sector.16 In spite of these obstacles, however,
Saudi Arabia continues to press ahead with new financing
schemes for its power projects. For instance, the 1200 MW PP9
power station north of Riyadh was funded using extra revenues
that were generated by a special tariff imposed on heavy consum-
ers since 1995 (the Halala Fund)." In addition, the expansion
of the 2400 MW Ghazlan II power plant was financed by an inter-
nationally syndicated US$500 million loan that has, as part of its
security, the right to call on receivables from prestigious custom-
ers like Saudi Aramco.58
The next test of Saudi commitment to the privatization pro-
cess will be the development of the 320 MW "captive" IPP that
Saudi Petrochemical Company ("Sadaf") plans for meeting its
55. Id. However, bankers say that the tariffs are at least double the pre-2000 level
and are sufficient to enable the SEC to cover its costs. Id.
56. Id. The US$2.2 billion Shuaiba plant was initially set to become the first IPP,
but plans for private investment did not materialize as a result of investor doubts about
the tariff and the regulatory and legal regime. The project is now being funded
through an Islamic financing by the A1-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation. See
Tentative Projects, supra note 24; Sladden, supra note 4; see also Challenging Future for Saudi
Power, PRIVATIZATION INTERNATIONAL, at 47.
57. Special Report: Power, MEED, Aug. 8, 1997.
58. Id.
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own power requirements. 5 9 It remains to be seen whether the
Saudi government has the political will necessary to implement
subsidy-free tariffs and a transparent legal and operating frame-
work. Until such a foundation is laid, private investors will con-
tinue to monitor progress from the sidelines.
VI. THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT POWER PROJECTS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
Independent power projects are a vital component in the
Middle East strategy for liberating the power sector. IPPs are
typically investor-owned, special purpose vehicles that generate
electricity either for bulk sale to an electric utility or for retail
sale to industrial or other customers. They are the quickest and
least intrusive method for injecting foreign investment into the
power sector and placing generation into private hands. In fact,
in many cases, IPPs precede the formal implementation of a
privatization program.6 ° This is because the privatization of new
power sources, as opposed to the privatization of existing gov-
ernment-owned utilities, can be carried out despite the absence
of a fully developed regulatory framework by providing for such
regulation in the project documentation.6 ' Thus, IPPs are im-
portant to Middle East privatization efforts not only because they
quickly create an expanded supply of electricity, but because
they are an easy and efficient way of transferring new generation
activities to the private sector.
As of January 2001, seven IPPs and a further three indepen-
dent water and power projects ("IWPPs") were either in, or were
about to enter, the construction phase.62 Many other projects
are under consideration throughout the region, including in Al-
geria, Egypt, Israel, the Gaza Strip, Iran, Jordan, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen.63 The growth of
IPPs in the region has brought along with it financing features
that are more typical of Western European projects, such as
59. See Saudi Arabia, supra note 50. Sadaf has short-listed bidders Enron Corpora-
tion and CMS Energy as the foreign partner on the project.
60. The Al Manah IPP in Oman preceded the implementation of Oman's priva-
tization program.
61. Manesh Hoskote, Independent Power Projects (IPPs): An Overview, The World
Bank Group, FPD Energy Note No.2, May 1995.
62. The Power Game, MEED, Jan. 26, 2001, at 23.
63. Id.
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longer loan tenors, less export credit agency involvement, and
attractive low pricing. To demonstrate this evolving trend, the
Al Manah IPP, the Taweelah Al IWPP, the Barka IWPP, and the
Al Kamil IPP financings will be examined.
VII. AL MANAH IPP (1994): THE POWER PIONEER
The Al Manah project involved constructing a 90 MW power
station and 186 km of transmission lines to link the power sta-
tion to the Oman power grid. The IPP operates within the sin-
gle government buyer context and has long-term power
purchase agreements with the Ministry of Electricity and Water.
For its first IPP, the Omani government opted for a build-own-
operate-transfer ("BOOT") structure. Under a BOOT structure,
the developers finance, build, own, and operate the project for a
limited period of time and then transfer the project back to the
state after project costs and project debt have been recovered.
Oman chose this structure because not only did it afford the gov-
ernment access to private investment with little completion risk
to itself, but it enabled the state to retain ultimate control over
the project.
The US$217 million Al Manah financing was dominated by
innovative equity arrangements, export credit agency support,
and loans that, for a power project, carried a relatively short
tenor.6 4 The equity funding was provided through two different
sources: sixty percent was provided by the developers and the
International Finance Corporation, the private division of the
World Bank ("IFC"), and forty percent was raised through a pub-
lic share offering on the Omani stock exchange, the Muscat Se-
curities Market. Thus, the project company (the United Power
Company) is owned not only by foreign project sponsors and the
IFC, but also by private Omani investors as well.
The debt financing consisted of the following loans: (a) a
US$15 million IFC loan, (b) two loans totaling US$65.5 million
from commercial banks that were guaranteed by the Export
Credit Guarantee Department, the United Kingdom export
credit agency ("ECGD"), and Compagnie Francaise pour le
Commerce Exterieur, the France export credit agency
("CoFACE"), (c) a US$45 million uncovered commercial bank
64. Loan tenors ranged from eight to 12 years.
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loan, and (d) a US$17 million loan from local banks. The debt-
to-equity ratio was 70:30.
As the first IPP in the Middle East, Al Manah presented its
developers and lenders with a unique set of circumstances that
had to be addressed in order to ensure a successful financing.
To begin with, the developers were not sure that they could raise
the necessary amount of public equity. In 1994, the Muscat Se-
curities Market was not well developed and traded shares only in
a limited number of companies.65 In fact, the financing docu-
ments permitted the debt-to-equity ratio to rise to 75:25 if the
public share offering on the Muscat Securities Market was not
fully subscribed. The developers also encountered hurdles in
seeking debt finance. Despite the healthy state of Oman's econ-
omy, at the time there was a general reluctance in the interna-
tional banking community to lend to projects in the Middle
East.66 The IFC's leadership6 thus proved vital in providing
credibility to the project.
The export credit agency (or "ECA") commitment to the
project produced both advantages and disadvantages. The in-
volvement of ECGD and CoFACE provided a degree of comfort
to the commercial banks that felt protected by the political lever-
age that these governmental credit agencies were capable of
wielding.6" Furthermore, ECA support ensured a relatively inex-
pensive means of finance for the project company, due to the
resulting low pricing offered on the loans. Nevertheless, ECA
participation also required time-consuming procedures that
delayed the financing process. 69 In the end, however, it was the
65. John Mobsby, BOT in the Gulf-Al Manah Power Station, PROJECT FIN. INT'L.,
Dec. 8, 1994.
66. See Middle East Project Finance: Oman to Play Leading Regional Roles, Aps REvIEw
DOWNSTRRAm TRENDS, Apr. 18, 1994; see also Martin Amison, Privatization and Project Fi-
nance in the Middle East, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1995.
67. As well as providing a direct loan, the IFC also acted as arranger and lead
syndicate bank for the export credit loans and the commercial bank loans.
68. It is widely believed that the involvement of foreign government and multina-
tional credit entities in a project make it (a) less likely that governmental agencies in
the host country will engage in politically risky behavior and (b) somewhat more likely
that the project will be accorded preferential treatment in the event of certain difficul-
ties (such as a foreign exchange shortage). See Brach et al., Today's Role for Export Credit
Agencies and Multilateral Financing Institutions in Latin American Project Finance, PROJECT
FIN. INT'L, Nov. 18, 1998.
69. ECA support requires that certain eligibility factors are met with respect to the
nationality of the investors and the origin of the exports being financed. Id. For exam-
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ECA presence that sold the deal to the international banking
community, as evidenced by the over-subscription at syndica-
tion. 70
As a result of the success of Al Manah, the United Power
Company embarked on a US$183 million expansion to increase
Al Manah's generating capacity to 270 MW. The financing was
signed in December 1999, and included US$60.5 million of debt
financing that was arranged by commercial banks and included
a CoFACE guarantee of off-taker credit. As with the initial pro-
ject, the expansion was devised according to the traditional
build-operate-and-transfer model and the power purchase agree-
ments remained solely with the Ministry of Electricity and Water.
The Al Manah scheme and its expansion, together with
Oman's demonstrated commitment to a comprehensive restruc-
turing of its power sector, provided the impetus for three fast-
track" private power projects and a host of future power asset
sales.72 Two of the new fast-track power schemes, Al Kamil and
Barka, will be discussed later in this Essay. The most ambitious
of these fast-track schemes, however, is the Salalah IPP, awarded
to developer PSEG Global in December 2000. BNP Paribas was
named as a financial advisor.
The 200 MW, US$270 million Salalah IPP will be another
first in the region for Oman-the first fully integrated private
power scheme to combine generation, transmission, and distri-
bution. The project company will not only build new generation
capacity, but it will also take on existing capacity and the existing
transmission and distribution networks in the area. The project
company will also be responsible for billing and revenue collec-
tion. The realization of the Salalah project in Oman will mean
the establishment of an important precedent in the Middle
East-the development of private power companies that are per-
mitted to sell and deliver power directly to end-users.
pie, Office National du Ducroire/Nationale Delcrederedienst, the Belgian ECA, had to
withdraw from the deal as there was not enough equipment being sourced from
Belgium. See Manah Almost Clear, PROJECT FIN. INT'L, Feb. 2, 1995. Furthermore, ECAs
also impose certain policy requirements on the borrower, including for example, com-
pliance with certain environmental and labor standards. Brach et al., supra note 68.
70. See Manah Oversubscribed, PROJECT FIN. INT'L, Oct. 27, 1994.
71. Oman's "fast-track" power program requires that these power projects are
ready to come on-line between 2002 and 2003. See Oman Unveils, PROJECT FIN. MAG.,
Feb. 1, 2000.
72. See Oman Seeks Investors to Develop its Power Sector, REUTERS, Oct. 29, 2000.
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In addition, Oman has, for the first time, announced plans
to invite bids from private investors for three of its largest ex-
isting and fully operational power plants. The three plants, the
Al Jizzi plant, the Al Rusail plant, and the Al Ghubrah plant,
have a combined total capacity of 1600 MW. 3 This shift towards
the privatization of existing power plants signals Oman's desire
to usher in the next phase of its privatization strategy.
VIII. TAWEELAH Al IWPP (2000): TEMPLATE FOR
THE FUTURE
The US$1.4 billion Taweelah Al IWPP in Abu Dhabi broke
new ground for Middle Eastern project finance. This project, a
build-own-operate (or "BOO") scheme, involved rehabilitating,
refurbishing, and expanding an existing power generation and
desalination plant to create a plant capable of generating 1350
MW and producing forty million gallons per day. When com-
pleted, Taweelah Al will supply about twenty-five percent of Abu
Dhabi's power and water needs.7"
The Taweelah Al transaction contained financing terms as
attractive as any available in Europe and even more attractive
than those being offered at the time in the U.S. project market.76
The US$1 billion financing boasted an 18.5 year term loan, the
longest loan tenor in the region. It was also notable for the lack
of ECA involvement. The fact that this project was able to obtain
attractive low pricing despite such a long tenor and no export
credit support is testament to the growing appetite of interna-
tional financial institutions for investing in the region. Indeed,
due to the overwhelming bank response during senior syndica-
tion, the financing never had to go to general syndication.77
73. Powering Up Oman, PROJECT FIN. MAG., Feb. 9, 2001.
74. BOO projects differ from BOOT projects in that the BOO project does not
revert to the government at the end of the term. BOO projects are gaining in popular-
ity for a number of reasons: (1) the transfer conditions in a BOOT project distorts the
pricing of the finance, (2) the transfer may ultimately prove unpopular with the public
subscribers, (3) the transfer adds complexity to the structure, and (4) there may be
uncertainty over whether the government will have the appropriate structures in place
and/or the desire to take back the project in the long run. See Martin Amison, Priva-
tization and Project Finance in the Middle East, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Nov. 1995, at 14.
75. See Ahmad, supra note 11.
76. See Fletcher & Davies, supra note 33.
77. See Europe, Middle East and Africa Awards 2000, Power Deal of the Year: Al Taweelah
Al, PROJECT FIN. INT'L Y.B., 2001, at 111.
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The equity structure of the deal was equally impressive. The
project's use of back-ended equity, which provides that the debt
financing be injected before the sponsors are obliged to inject
their equity funding, set a precedent for a Middle East transac-
tion. The credit strength of the sponsors enabled this structure
to be adopted.78 Although back-ended equity is a common fea-
ture in U.S. and European projects, it was a first for the Middle
East. Furthermore, the developers achieved a far lower propor-
tion of equity funding than other deals in the region, with the
project obtaining a 75:25 debt-to-equity ratio. 9
The terms of the US$1.015 billion commercial bank facility
were also notable for several reasons. The tenor of the loan was
a straight 18.5 years, a previously unthinkable achievement in a
region where twelve years was once considered aggressive.8"
Moreover, because the government wanted to set a long term
benchmark for lending into the country, the loan did not have a
''cash sweep" mechanism or an equivalent feature obliging the
developers to refinance the bank debt prior to its stated matur-
ity.81
While Taweelah Al's tenor is applauded as a sign of market
maturity, many bank lenders are concerned that the regional
bank appetite for long-term exposure may dry up due to the
number of lengthy, liquidity-absorbing transactions that are due
to come to the market in the near future. 2 A senior Gulf
banker has said that "[t]here is a growing concern over the ca-
pacity of regional balance sheets to be exposed to this sort of
tenor. If people keep on pushing for these deals without clauses
allowing for refinancing at years ten to twelve, one is going to fail
78. Fletcher & Davies, supra note 33.
79. Id. See also Nabeela Khan, Landmark Success, IFR REvIEw OF THE YEAR 2000.
80. Fletcher & Davies, supra note 33.
81. Europe, Middle East and Africa Awards 2000, Power Deal of the Year, Al Taweelah Al,
PROJECT FIN. INT'L Y.B., 2001, at 111. In contrast, although the 1999 predecessor Tawee-
lah A2 project carried a seventeen year loan tenor, it also contained an automatic refi-
nancing provision that locks up dividends after year seven if the debt is not refinanced
by then. Thus, in essence, the financial arrangers in the 1999 Taweelah A2 deal were
able to sell the international bank market a seven year loan dressed up as a seventeen
year tenor. Rod Morrison, Omani Power Deals Stretch, PROJECr FIN. INT'L Feb. 21, 2001, at
33; see Taweelah Musings, PROJECT FIN. INT'L, Sept.22, 1999.
82. "Most of the regional banks have short-term funding, and with [asset/liability]
mismatch management a dark science, their appetite for 15-20 year exposures are lim-
ited," says one regional banker. "We've not found the limit yet, but it's not so far away."
Special Report: Banking, MEED, Mar. 2, 2001, at 28.
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soon. Project sponsors are going to have to start listening to
what the banks want."83 It appears that, with the Al Kamil and
Barka financings, the project sponsors have heard.
IX. BEYOND TAWEELAH: AL KAMIL AND BARKA (2001)
The Al Kamil and Barka power project financings follow the
Taweelah template. The loans in both deals are not covered by
export credit and carry the longest tenors ever done in Oman.
However, both diverge from Taweelah Al in that they provide
incentives for the project sponsors to seek refinancing prior to
loan maturity, albeit in different ways.
The Al Kamil 275 MW IPP was the first project to be
awarded in Oman's fast-track private power program. This pro-
ject is being developed by International Power on a BOO basis.
The government chose to use the BOO model this time instead
of the BOOT model used for Al Manah because the BOO model
"is regarded as achieving the best value for money while being
consistent with our wider privatization objectives.""4 Like Tawee-
lah Al, Al Kamil's US$100 million financing s5 is an uncovered,
internationally syndicated loan with a lengthy tenor of sixteen
years. In addition, the debt-to-equity ratio is approximately
80:20. Unlike Taweelah Al, however, the deal features straight
amortizing financing with pricing that steps up to a higher rate
over time to encourage refinancing. In addition, at years 1, 5,
and 11, the loan provides a sweep to ensure that the coverage
ratios for the debt are maintained.
The Barka LWPP scheme was the second project to be
awarded in Oman's fast-track power program and is Oman's first
IWPP. The project, which is sponsored by AES and Multitech,
involves building a 427 MW, twenty million gallon per day power
and desalination plant. The uncovered loan is made up of a
US$332 million term loan and a US$16.6 million standby loan
and has a sixteen year tenor, the longest in Oman to date.86
Similar to Taweelah A2 (1999), the Barka financing contains a
cash sweep and dividend lock-up at year eleven, which provides
83. Tom Everett-Heath, Shape of Deals to Come, MEED, Oct. 20, 2000.
84. Oman Unveils, PROJECr FIN. MAc., Feb. 1, 2000.
85. The financing for Al Kamil was arranged by Bank Muscat and Socit6 Gfnhr-
ale. See PROJECT FIN. INT'L, Apr. 4, 2001.
86. The Barka financing was arranged by ANZ Investment Bank and Arab Banking
Corporation.
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an incentive for the sponsors to refinance the project before
then. If the loan goes beyond year eleven, however, there is a
bullet repayment at year sixteen. This bullet back-ends the re-
payment profile of the loan even further to improve the develop-
ers' internal rate of return. 7
Whether the Salalah financing will follow the lead of the
other two fast-track projects and offer a lengthy loan with a refi-
nancing clause remains to be seen. It will be interesting to ob-
serve how new power deals throughout the Middle East grapple
with the issue of what is considered a bankable tenor in the re-
gion. Indeed, it looks as if we will not be waiting long for the
next IPP to reach financial closure.
CONCLUSION
The privatization strategies of Abu Dhabi, Jordan and Saudi
Arabia illustrate common trends in how countries in the Middle
East are addressing their needs for greater capacity and effi-
ciency in the power sector. The formula consists of (i) un-
bundling generation, transmission, and distribution activities
and corporatizing them, (ii) encouraging IPPs and the gradual
privatization of existing generation plants, (iii) maintaining a
substantial degree of government control over the transmission
sector, and (iv) establishing an independent regulatory body to
monitor tariff charges and the performance of newly privatized
companies. Although this formula has the advantage of being
an easy way for the private sector to get involved, it also holds
some challenges.
First, it may prove difficult for countries to make the transi-
tion from the single buyer model to an open electricity market.
In the single buyer model, certain interest groups may become
entrenched and will be reluctant to cede their powerful posi-
tions to a fully liberalized market.88 Second, customer tariffs
must be structured high enough to provide an attractive rate of
return for investors, but low enough to still be palatable to con-
sumers. This is especially true where governments have previ-
ously subsidized the cost of electricity. If government subsidies
to consumers must remain, governments should only target
87. Rod Morrison, Omani Power Deals Stretch, PROJECT FIN. INT'L, Feb. 21, 2001, at
33.
88. See Saudi Arabia: Avoiding the California Nightmare, supra note 50, at 4-5.
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those consumers who truly need it, as is being proposed in Abu
Dhabi. In addition, governments must be willing to cover the
costs of these targeted subsidies, so that corporate utilities can
maintain healthy balance sheets.89
Third, government aversion to providing sovereign guaran-
tees makes it much more difficult to attract investors, including
export credit agencies and multilateral institutions.9 ° Although
it is true that one of the necessary steps towards privatization is
to create fully independent corporate entities that can stand on
their own, it is not reasonable to expect developers to enter into
unsupported contracts with newly formed companies that have
no operating or financial history of their own. In order to have a
successful project, the risks and returns to both the government
and the investors must be balanced. 91
The evolution of IPP financing structures in the region sig-
nals the increasing interest and comfort level that investors have
for the Middle East. Export credit agencies and heavy equity
participation are no longer the sine qua non of project financing
in the region. Although Taweelah Al, Al Kamil, and Barka have
proved that long sustainable tenors can be achieved, the key to
continuing project development in the Middle East will be the
ability to expand the depth and diversity of the lending market.
The international banks will eventually reach their country expo-
sure limits and developers will have to look elsewhere to finance
and refinance project debt. Alternative sources of financing in-
clude the capital markets, Islamic financing, and the regional
bank market.
The international capital markets possess virtually untapped
financing potential, 92 particularly for refinancing and/or expan-
sion projects in the power and oil/gas sectors.9" Pricing, how-
89. One method that governments may employ to get around the problem of
projects with uneconomic rates of return due to subsidized consumer tariffs is to pass
through the subsidy to the project company by arranging cheap fuel supply contracts
with state-owned fuel companies. This solution, however, creates an indirect subsidy to
the project, which only serves to transfer inefficiency from the power sector to the fuel
supply sector.
90. See Phillip Carter, Generating Excitement, PROJECr AND TRADE FIN., Mar. 1997.
91. Privatization Issues in the GCC States, PROJECT FIN. INT'L, Mar. 12, 1997.
92. Ras Laffan LNG Project has thus far been the only project bond to be issued in
the Gulf region.
93. Project bonds are a good option for refinancing or expanding existing opera-
tional projects. Once a project is performing well and has begun to develop stable
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ever, will ultimately dictate whether (and when) project bonds
are issued.94 The regional capital markets are still in a relatively
early stage of development, but they will certainly play a larger
role in the future.
The Islamic finance market 5 is another possible source of
liquidity. In 1999, the Abu Dhabi-based Thuraya Satellite Com-
pany signed a US$100 million Islamic facility with Abu Dhabi
Islamic Bank (or "ADIB").96 In the same year, ABC Islamic Bank
arranged a US$56 million facility for Sharjah Electricity & Water
Authority. 97 In addition, it is rumored that there may be a
tranche of Islamic debt in the upcoming Abu Dhabi Shuweihat
1WPP financing.98 Despite these recent inroads, many bankers
express doubt about the ability of Islamic finance to achieve a
dominant financial presence in the market. Structural complex-
ity and Islamic banks' limited appetite for long tenor deals are
cited as the main obstacles to its emergence as a principal source
of funding.99 However, others acknowledge that "if there is a
liquidity squeeze around the corner, it is likely that the Islamic
market will increasingly be tapped, particularly for smaller deals
or for tranches worth US$100-150 million on larger deals." 00
The local and regional bank markets are currently the most
utilized source of alternative financing. Sustained oil prices have
left most banks in the region flush with cash. These banks must
find ways in which to deploy their capital. In many cases, local
earnings and reliable cash flows, the bond market will be more likely to respond with
longer maturities and competitive pricing. In the Al Manah expansion project,
Goldman Sachs initially considered issuing a bond to take out the IFC and ECA loans.
See UPG to expand Manah, PROJECT FIN. INT'L, May 7, 1998.
94. See Shape of Deals to Come, MEED, Oct. 20, 2000. Last year, one of the banks
bidding for the arranger mandate for the Oman Gas Company pipeline project offered
a project bond solution. Although the bid ultimately failed, it nevertheless demon-
strates that project bonds continue to be considered a viable financing option in the
region. See Thinking New Thoughts, MEED, Mar. 2, 2001.
95. The Islamic financing system is based upon the principle that Islamic banks
share in the risks of a transaction in return for a share of its profits. Islamic finance
must be clear of iba, which is capital that may be considered unjustifiable or excessive
under Islamic law (this includes interest). See Richard de Belder & Chris Ruder, Middle
East: An Overview of Project Finance and Islamic Finance, INT'L FIN. L. REv, (1999).
96. The Thuraya financing also included a US$420 million international loan facil-
ity.
97. See Thinking New Thoughts, MEED, Mar. 2, 2001.
98. Ahmad, supra note 11.
99. See id.
100. Thinking New Thoughts, supra note 97.
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projects have not created a sufficient volume of attractive lend-
ing opportunities. Thus, many local banks are taking more ac-
tive roles in international syndicates and are participating in
more cross-border deals. 01 Although there is a vast amount of
liquidity currently available in the Middle East bank market, re-
gional and local banks will need to devise medium-to-long-term
strategies on how to best develop and sustain sufficient levels of
funding to support future project deal flow. This will prove par-
ticularly important if long tenors continue to be the rule and/or
the oil price drops to a lower level.
In conclusion, what was once considered a mirage in the
Middle East is now starting to take on a more defined and lasting
appearance. Many Gulf states have developed, or are in the pro-
cess of developing, long-term, deliberate privatization strategies
to meet their future demand for electricity. The regional fi-
nance markets are becoming more sophisticated and local banks
are eager to assume more of a leadership role in these projects.
It is time for governments to demonstrate their commitment to
the process by establishing transparent regulatory structures, en-
forcing disciplined tariffs, and creating the right infrastructure
to strengthen the regional markets. If reform is not imple-
mented in this manner, the sustainability of the privatization
process will be put at risk and the investment flow in the power
sector will once again be reduced to a trickle.
101. For instance, Saudi American Bank and Saudi Investment Bank participated
at the arranger and co-arranger level, respectively, in Abu Dhabi's Taweelah Al IWPP.
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